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Abstract
Acevedo  identifies the determinants of wages and  productivity  after NAFTA than before.  Endogenous
productivity  in Mexico  over time  using national  training effects are  larger for productivity  than for wages,
representative  linked employer-employee  databases from  suggesting that the employers  share the costs and returns
the manufacturing  sector.  She shows that both employers  to training. The author  also finds that investment  in
and employees  are benefiting from  investments in  human capital  magnifies  technology-driven  productivity
education,  training,  work experience,  foreign research  gains.  By comparing  four regions of Mexico-north,
and development,  and openness after the North  center, south, and Mexico  City-regional wage and
American Free  Trade Agreement  (NAFTA).  Additional  productivity gaps are found to have  increased over time.
years of schooling  have  a higher impact on wages and
This paper-a product of the Economic Policy Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is a background paper
for the region's 2002 Flagship Report "Knowledge  in Latin America and the Caribbean: Reconsidering Education, Training,
and Technology Policies."  Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,
DC  20433.  Please  contact  Michael  Geller,  room  14-046,  telephone  202-458-5155,  fax  202-522-2112,  email  address
mgeller@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The
author may be contacted  at gacevedo@worldbank.org.  January  2003. (36 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations  are  less than fully polished The
papers carry the names of the authors  and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced  by the  Research  Advisory  StaffWages and Productivity in Mexican Manufacturing
Gladys Lopez Acevedo  (LCSPE)'
World Bank
Insurgentes Sur 1605 piso 24
Col. San Jose Insurgentes
Mexico 03900, D.F.
gacevedo(worldbank.org
Background paper for the 2002 LAC Flagship Report
"Knowledge in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Reconsidering Education,  Training and Technology Policies"
With valuable research  assistance from Marcela Rubio, this paper was completed  as part of the 2002 Flagship Report
"Knowledge  in  Latin America and the Canbbean-  Reconsidenng Education,  Training and Technology Policies" and the
Technology,  Wages and Employment project at the World Bank.  These are views of  the author, and do not necessarily
reflect those of  the Govemrnent  of Mexico;  the World Bank, its Executive Directors,  or countries they represent.
Please  send your comments to gacevedo(iworldbank.org.  Thank you to Hong Tan, Indermit Gill, Abigail Duran
(INEGI-Aguascalientes),  and Alex Cano (INEGI-  Aguascalientes)  for valuable  help and discussion. Valuable
comments were received from participants  attending the LACEA2002 Conference in Madnd, Spain.Introduction
Since the  introduction of the  North American  Free  Trade Agreement  (NAFTA),
the dynamics  of the Mexican  economy have  changed  substantially.  When NAFTA was
introduced,  manufactured  products  only accounted  for  35  percent  of Mexican  exports.
Since  then,  the  manufacturing  sector  has  grown  to  produce  close  to  90  percent  of
Mexican exports.  However, the annual growth rate of labor productivity in Mexico is low
compared  to  other  developing  countries  (World  Bank  1998a).  Dar and  others  (2000)
contend that one plausible  explanation  for the slow  growth  in labor productivity  is  that
Mexican  workers  have  a  lower  education  level,  resulting  in  the  deficiency  of human
capital accumulation on-the-job  as compared to elsewhere.'
The  empirical  evidence  on the  links between human  capital  (schooling),  on the
one hand,  and productivity  and wage  growth on the other, is  strong.  Numerous  studies
using worker-level  data have  also  shown that more  educated  and/or trained individuals
are also more productive  in a rapidly changing  environment  in which cognitive abilities
to  process  new  information  are  most  important,  and  thus  earn higher  incomes  (Welch,
1970;  Mincer,  1989;  L6pez-Acevedo  and  Tan;  2002).  Human  capital  (education)  is
viewed not only as  an investment but  also as a factor of production.  Human  capital is  a
stock  of skills  produced  by  education  and  training  (Welch  1970  and  Mincer  1989).
Highly educated  workers  have  a  comparative  advantage  with respect  to  the adjustment
and  implementation  of new  technologies.  For  this  reason,  the  productivity  of highly-
educated relative to less-educated workers is greater (Bartel and Lichtenberg  1987).
There  is  limited,  but  growing,  empirical  literature  on  the  link  between  human
capital  (training)  and  firms'  perfornance  (Koning  1994;  Revenga  1995;  Batra and  Tan
1995;  Barrett  and  O'Connell  1998;  World  Bank  1998a,  1998b,  1999,  2000,  2001a,
2001b;  Dearden,  Reed,  and  Van Reenen  2000).  Using panel  data,  several  studies have
The increase in  wages associated with an additional year of work experience for Mexican men is  low
compared to the increase  for men with similar educational attainment in other countries (3.8 percent in
Mexico  compared with 8.1 percent in United States,  8.4 percent in Japan, and 9.1 percent in France). This
rate is low even when compared with the rate in countries at a similar level of development and with
comparable education indicators,  such as Brazil  (6.2 percent) and Colombia (5.8 percent).
2shown the positive impact of training  on productivity  (Nielsen and Rosholm 2002; Batra
and Tan  1995; Dearden,  Reed, and Van Reenen 2000).
Extensive  literature has been compiled  in the closely related field of the impact of
human  capital  (training)  on workers'  wages.  A  consensus  has  nearly been  made  that
earnings increase with more training.  The increase is in the range of 20 percent  in most
developing  countries  (Middleton  and  others  1993;  Dar  and  others  2000;  Nielsen  and
Rosholm 2001).
Given the well-documented  correlation between wage growth, on-the-job  training,
and productivity  observed in many countries,  the observed labor productivity growth rate
difference  between  Mexico  and  elsewhere  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  in
Mexico  post-school  investment  in human  capital  results  in lower  productivity  growth.
The observed  low level  of investment  in human  capital could  also be explained  by the
incentive  structure of labor regulations.  In practice,  as has been well-documented,  firms
appear  to  enjoy  more  flexibility  than  a  strict  interpretation  of the  law  would  suggest
(World Bank 1999).
This paper analyzes  wage  and productivity  determination  in Mexico.  This paper
differs from previous  labor market studies in Mexico in five ways.  First, by using linked
employer-employee  datasets,  this  paper  adds  a  new  dimension  to  traditional  wage
analysis.  Most wage  studies only have detailed  information  about  individual  workers;
however, this paper has detailed information  about both individual workers  and the firms.
Second,  the impact of employer  and employee characteristics  on wages and productivity
before  and  after NAFTA  is  analyzed.  Third,  to  assess  the  marginal  impact of human
capital and other characteristics  on both wages and productivity,  joint equations  of wage
and  production  functions  are  estimated.  This  methodology  allows  us  to  compare  the
impact  that  each  variable  has  on wages  with the  impact that  it has  on productivity.  In
other  words,  how the  distribution  of benefits  (in terms  of wages  and  productivity)  are
shared  by  workers  and  firms  Fourth,  training  is  treated  as  an  endogenous  variable
following Nielsen and Rosholm (2002).  And fifth, restricting the sample set to firms of a
3particular  size firm-specific  effects  are  estimated.  Studies  on wages  and productivity  in
developing  countries  identify  firm  size as  another  significant  determinant  of wages and
productivity  (Tan  and  Batra,  2000).  As  noted by Brown  and  Medoff (1989),  with  all
other  factors being equal,  large employers  pay more than  small employers.  One way to
explain this wage differential  is that larger firms employ higher quality workers because
of the greater capital intensity and capital-skill requirements of larger establishments.
This  paper  is  organized  by  first  introducing  the  data.  Second,  the  descriptive
statistics are presented.  Third, the methodology is described.  Fourth, the determinants of
wages  and productivity are analyzed by first analyzing employee  characteristics  and then
by analyzing  firm characteristics.  The effects of variables on wages and productivity  are
compared.  The wage and productivity effects of training treated  as endogenous  are also
discussed.  The final section offers the conclusions of these findings.
2. Data
The  data  used  in  this paper  come  from  the  National  Survey  of Employment,
Salaries, Technology and Training (ENESTYC) and the National  Survey of Employment
to Workers  in the  Manufacturing  Sector  (ENTRAM)2. The  data include  observations
from 1993  and  1999.  INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,  Geografia  e Informnatica)
has compiled the ENESTYC and ENTRAM.  The ENESTYC gathers rich information on
training,  technology,  wages,  employment,  forms of labor contracting,  and internal plant
organization of Mexican manufacturing  firms.  In  1993 the ENTRAM  interviewed  7,619
employees  from  575  firms  in  the  ENESTYC  survey.  About  15  randomly  selected
workers  from  different  occupational  categories  were  interviewed  in  each  company  in
1993.  In  1999  the  ENTRAM  interviewed  6,259  employees  from  722  firms  in  the
ENESTYC  survey.  About  10  randomly  selected  workers  from  different  occupational
categories were interviewed in each company in 1999.
The  wage  data  was  obtained  from  ENTRAM,  as  reported  by the  worker  and
converted to real  1997 pesos.  The productivity per worker measure was calculated  from
2 For a full description of these surveys see Appendix A
4ENESTYC,  using  INEGI's  methodology,  that is, the difference  between the value of the
production of the firm  and its  expenditure  in non-labor  inputs  in real  1997  pesos,  then
divided by the total number of workers in the firm.
The  information  on  individual  establishments  that  INEGI  gathers  through  its
questionnaires  (which  firms  are  required  to  answer  by  law)  is  legally  confidential;
therefore, we followed an established procedure in which most data analysis was done in
lNEGI's  Aguascalientes  headquarters  with  the  support  of  INEGI  personnel.
Nevertheless,  the reader should bear in mind the limitations  for data analysis imposed by
this institutional arrangement.
3. Descriptive  Statistics
The  distribution  of relevant  variables  is  tabulated,  with  sampling  weights,  in
Table  1. 3  From  this table,  it is  apparent  that  the percentage  of female  employees  has
increased  from  1993  to  1999 by 6 percentage  points.  Manufacturing  firms seem to  be
most  concentrated  in  Central  Mexico.  According  to  the  division  of  activity,  basic
metallic industries  and other manufacturing  industries  increased their shares by the most
- from 3 to 4 percent and from 1 to 5 percent, respectively.  On the other hand, the share
of the wood and wood products industry decreased  the most - from 7 to 4 percent.  The
percentage  of firms  with more  than 50 percent  foreign  capital  increased  from  15  to  19
percent.  The  percentage  of  firms  that  invest  in  research  and  development  (R&D)
diminished  from  57 to  33  percent;  whereas,  the percentage  of firms  that  adopted  new
technology increased  from 71  percent in  1993 to  86 percent in 1999.  Small and medium
firms decreased  from 20 to  18 percent  and from 35 to  18 percent, respectively.  The share
of micro firms tripled.  Most significantly,  the share of firms that export more than half of
their products increased more than three times.
3 For a complete  list of vanables see Appendix B.
5Table 1: Percent share of some  relevant variables
Variables  1993  1999  Variables  1993  1999
Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent
Gender  The firm's foreign capital is more
than 50% of firm's total capital
Female  28.97  34.87  o  85.12  80.92
Male  71.03  65.13  Yes  14.88  19.08
The worker belongs  to a union?  Firm's exports  are more than
50% of output
No  50.09  56.75  No  93.39  75.75
Yes  49.91  43.25  Yes  6.61  24.25
In-house training  The firm has quality controls
No  80.31  76.67  o  77.82  75.31
Yes  19.69  23.33  Yes  22.18  24.69
External training  The firm invests in R&D
No  81.44  80.00  No  43.27  67.38
Yes  18.56  20.00  Yes  56.73  32.62
Did the firm adopt new
Type of worker  technology?
Eventual  21.80  20.21  No  29.08  13.59
Permanent  78.20  79.79  Yes  70.92  86.41
Division of activity  Size
Food, beverages, and tobacco  22.62  19.62  Micro  5.71  17.11
Textiles,  clothing and leather  15.46  18.93  Small  20.25  17.86
Wood and wood products  6.94  4.39  Meduum  34.88  14.49
aper, paper products, printing, and  5.33  5.38
publishing  Large  39.16  50.54
Chemicals, oil derivatives,  and coal  11.01  11.64  Region
Non-metallic mineral products  5.09  5.16  North  27.70  32.63
Basic metallic industries  3.09  4.20  Center  43.24  45.93
Metallic products,  machinery,  and  29.43  25.47
equipment.  South  4.42  5.62
Other manufacturing  mdustnes  1.04  5.21  Mexico City  24.64  15.81
Source  Author's calculations  based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
Table  2  shows the  increasing  importance  that human  capital has had  on firms;
meaning that the effect has become more important since NAFTA took effect.  All of the
indicators increased from 1993 to  1999.  A significant increase in all types of training can
be seen between  the two years.  The average number of years of education  increased  as
well by about 8 percent.  The only indicator that decreased was seniority by 4 percent.
The analysis here will focus on formal training only, that is the training provided
in-house in firm training programs or by external  sources.  Formal in-house or in-service
6training courses are given by firm personnel.  External training describes formal training
courses given by external agents.  Most of the training is provided by private institutions.
Table 2: Distribution of the Human Ca  ital Variables
1993  1999
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.
Training  38.24%  - 43.33%  -
In-house training  19.69%  - 23.33%  -
Extemal training  18.56%  - 20.00%  -
Years of education  9.10  3.98  9.82  3.25
Seniority  15.40  11.51  14.82  10.60
Source: Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
Table  3 shows  the percentage  of training  according  to  various  factors  such  as
gender,  location of firm, and size of firm.  It is apparent that male workers received more
training  than  females  in both  1993  and  1999,  in  both  external  training  and  training  in
general.  In  1993 and  1999,  the percentage  of males  and females who received  in-house
training  was about  the same, but the percentage of females  was slightly  higher in  both
Table 3: Distribution of Training variables
1993  1999
In-house  External  In-house  External
Variable  Training  Training  Training  Training  Training  Training
Female Workers  34.13  19.91  14.22  41.47  23.91  17.55
Male Workers  39.92  19.59  20.32  44.32  23.02  21.30
North  34.61  18.65  15.97  42.21  23.89  18.32
Center  43.87  22.92  20.95  45.29  23.66  21.63
South  37.24  14.01  23.23  31.58  13.34  18.24
Mexico City  32.62  16.19  16.43  43.48  24.01  19.47
Micro Firms  14.73  8.82  5.90  10.37  4.42  5.95
Small Firms  23.43  9.12  14.31  29.34  12.39  16.95
Medium Firms  35.60  14.25  21.35  47.03  21.84  25.19
Large Firms  51.68  31.57  20.11  58.37  34.03  24.34
Source: Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
7years.  All measures  of training for both genders increased from  1993  to  1999.  In terms
of the location of firm - North, Center, South, and Mexico City - all firms increased their
training between  the two years with the exception of southern  firms.  With respect  to the
size  of  the  firm,  training  is  positively  correlated  with  firm  size  in  both  years.
Furthermore, training increased  from 1993  to  1999 in all firm sizes except in micro-sized
firms.
Table  4  presents  the average  logarithms  of both  productivity  and  wages  of the
workers.  All of the results have been categorized  by various types of training  - training,
no training,  in-house training,  and external training.  By using the average  wage of firms
in the sample in  1993  and  1999 - 6.89 and 7.81, respectively - we can then compare the
effects of training  on wages.  In all cases,  having training, having in-house training,  and
having  external  training all appear to be related to higher wages in both  1993  and  1999.
Not surprisingly,  the reverse was also true in that having no training at all,  having no in-
house training,  and having no external  training, all appear to be related with wages below
the  average.  Concerning  productivity,  those  firms  that  provided  their  workers  with
training were more productive in both  1993 and  1999.  Not surprisingly,  those firms that
did not provide any training were not as productive as the national average.
Table 4: Mean Value  of wages  and productivity
Wages  Productivity
Variable  1993  1999  Variable  1993  1999
Mean log wage  6.89  7.81 Mean log productivity  3.52  4.54
Mean log wage no training  6.69  7.63 Mean log productivity no training  3.37  4.22
Mean log wage training  7.20  8.05 Mean log productivity training  3 75  4.95
Mean log wage no in-house trauiing  6.88  7.80 Mean log productivity no in-house training  3.44  4.41
Mean log wage in-house training  6.92  7.85 Mean log productivity in-house training  3.83  4.98
Mean log wage no external training  6.75  7.70 Mean log productivity no extemal training  3.48  4.44
Mean log wage external traiming  7.49  8.28 Mean log productivity extemal training  3.67  4.92
Source.  Authors' calculations  based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC
8The effect of training had a greater positive effect on wages in 1993 than in 1999
with the exception of in-house training in which the effect was similar for both years.  On
the other hand, the effect of productivity was greater in 1999 than in 1993 for all types of
training.  In  the  following  section,  the  trend  described  in  this  section  are  analyzed
formally using a regression framework.
4. Methodology
First,  a  general  model  that  contained  all  relevant  explanatory  variables  was
formulated.  Second, eliminating statistically insignificant variables one at a time reduces
this model to a more concise  one.  Workers  are the unit of observation,  and both workers
and  firm's  characteristics  are  included  in  the  individual  vector  of  variables.  The
dependent  variables  are monthly  wages and  value  added-productivity  per worker.  The
equations are estimated jointly (sureg) to make the link between wages and productivity.
Let  Pbe a  2  column  matrix  containing  wages  and  productivity,  Z  a matrix  of
worker's  characteristics  such  as  age,  years  of education,  time  working  for  that  firm,
potential  experience,  training,  gender,  union membership,  and type of contract.  X  is a
matrix of firm characteristics  such as research and development (R &  D), new technology
adoption,  ownership, age, export orientation, quality control,  firm size, region, and sector
of activity.  The regression error is  E.  The coefficients are the vectors  a  and ,8.
P= a-Z+3-  X+E  (1)  .
Since the  independent  variables  are the same in the system,  seemingly  unrelated
regression  equations (sureg)  are equivalent  to the OLS  estimation, equation by equation.
By estimating  (1)  as a  system, there  is a gain in efficiency  since the disturbances  in the
wage  and  productivity  equations  are  contemporaneously  correlated.  Further,  the joint
4Vemer  (1999)  argues that,  in general, this methodology may cause aggregation biases;  it may:  (1) overestimate  the
firm effect,  namely productivity;  and (2) underestimate  the individual  effect on wages and productivity.  A multilevel
estimation  takes  into  account  aggregation  biases;  however,  the  small  firms  have too few  employees  to  enable  us to
perform the multilevel analysis.
9estimation  allows us to  test for the equality of the coefficients  in (1).  In order to  avoid
aggregation biases, equation  (1) was also estimated by firm size.
5. Results
This  section discusses  the  results  of the  estimation  using  both wages  and  value
added  productivity5. The  employee  characteristics  that  are  examined  include  the
following:  (i)  schooling;  (ii)  training;  (iii)  potential  experience;  (iv)  gender;  (v)  union
membership;  and (vi) type of contract.  The characteristics of the firms that are examined
are:  (i) R&D;  (ii) export orientation and foreign ownership; (iii) quality control;  (iv) firm
size; (v)  location;  and (vi) sector of activity.  For every relevant variable, the estimation
(with sampling  weights) was done for all  firms, which  are the pooled  coefficients.  Then
the estimation was done for every group of firms, classified by size,  so that we were able
to differentiate the effect by firm size.6
Individual Characteristics of  Employees
. Schooling
Education  has been singled  out  as the  most important  factor in determining  wages
and  earnings  inequality  in  Mexico.  This  realization  has  increased  the  importance  of
education  over  time.  Not  surprisingly,  the  results  of the  wage-productivity  equation
indicate  that  schooling increases  wages  as  can be seen in Table 5.  The coefficients  are
significantly different from zero in both 1993 and  1999 for all firm sizes.
These  findings  are  not  surprising.  A  worker  receives  higher  wages  with  more
education,  conditional  on  other  relevant  individual  characteristics  as  well  as  on
characteristics  of the  firm.  In  the  1999  findings,  an  additional  year  of schooling  was
shown  to  yield  a 10  percent  increase  in  wages  versus  the  9 percent  found in the  1993
findings.  Typical rate of return studies  in Mexico  show that  schooling increases  wages
5 Joint estimation  using wages  and average  product per worker  were also  estimated.  The results  are similar to those
discussed in this paper  Results are available  upon request
6 The results of the pooled joint estimations are  on Appendix C. The results by firmn size are available  upon request.
10by 10 percent (World Bank,  1998a).  This finding suggest that education returns have not
been overstated  in typical rate of return studies that ignore training and demand factors -
the firm characteristics.7
Table 5: Schooling
Variable  1993  1999
Edu  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>jzl
ooled  0.09  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.04  0.00
Micro  0.07  0.00  0.07  0.04  0.07  0.00  0.05  0.16
Small  0.10  0.00  0.01  0.37  0.09  0.00  0.08  0.00
Medium  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.64  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.81
Large  0.09  0.00  0.02  0.15  0.10  0.00  0.05  0.01
Source- Author's  calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC
An additional  year of schooling  yields  a 10  percent  increase  in wages  in small,
medium  and  large  firms,  but  only  7  percent  in  micro  firms.  However,  additional
schooling  has  a  greater  productivity  enhancing  effect  for  workers  in  micro  and  small
firms.  In micro  firms,  however,  the  effect of schooling  on productivity  decreased  over
time by 2 percentage points.
The results  also reveal  a positive  and statistically  significant  effect  of schooling  on
productivity in both  1993 and  1999 (an increase from 2 to 4 percent).  The positive effect
of schooling on productivity in large firms in 1999 is statistically significant  compared to
1993.
However,  the  hypothesis  which  states  that  the  effect  of education  on  wages  and
productivity  would  be the  same  must be  rejected  since  the  difference  was  greater  for
wages,  meaning that workers'  benefits are  higher than those of firms.8 This  means that
workers have greater benefits than firms from schooling.
7A potential  source  of bias could arise in standard  rate  of retums to  schooling studies  because  most of them do  not
control  for the ability of the  individual.  Card (2001)  uses  several instruments  to correct  this problem.  He  shows that
the coefficient of  the  schooling variable  is even larger after controlling for the endogeneity  of schooling.
8We  performed  hypothesis tests  for the equality of the wage and productivity coefficients.  Results  are on Appendix
C.ii.  Training
The regression  results indicate that in-service  training accounted  for higher wages
in  1999  but  not  in  1993(see  Table  6).  In-house  training  is  positively  correlated  to
productivity in  1993.  In  1999,  in-house training had  a positive  and significant effect on
wages and productivity in medium size firms.  In 1993,  only the firms benefited from in-
house training.
Table 6: In-house Trainin
Variable  1993  1999
Teachi  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>lzl  Productivity  P> zl
ooled  -0.13  0.00  0.16  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.30
icro  -0.80  0.00  2.83  0.00  0.06  0.81  -0.09  0.87
mall  -0.12  0.37  -0.03  0.90  -0.09  0.20  -0.29  0.11
Medium  -0.02  0.85  0.03  0.84  0.09  0.03  0.44  0.00
Large  -0.07  0.24  0.05  0.60  0.03  0.50  -0.01  0.95
Source  Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
In  1999,  workers  who  received  external training  earned,  on average,  26 percent
higher  wages  (see  Table 7).  This result  accounts  for a productivity  increase of only 14
percent  for  workers  who  received  external  training.  Thus,  training  obtained  outside  a
firm increases  productivity.  This finding suggests that employees  benefit the most from
external  training with a 26 percent wage premium  compared  to 5 percent  from in-house
training.  In 1999,  we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients  for external
training on the wages and productivity  estimates, which suggests that both employers  and
employees are benefiting equally from external training.
Table 7: External Training
Variable  1993  1999
Teachx  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
ooled  -0.16  0.00  0.07  0.40  0.26  0.00  0.14  0.08
Micro  -0.87  0.00  0.44  0.41  0.33  0.01  -0.17  0.58
Small  0.05  0.68  0.35  0.06  0.10  0.12  -0.04  0.79
Medium  -0.05  0.41  0.09  0.41  0.25  0.00  0.47  0.00
Large  -0.25  0.00  -0.20  0.10  0.25  0.00  0.09  0.51
Source  Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
12The  wage  return  of both  in-house  and  external  training  changed  from  being
negative  in  1993  to being positive in 1999,  which suggests  a growing  demand for skills
since NAFTA took effect.
Does  Mexico  under  invest  in training?  The answer appears  to be that it does  as
indicated by the very high returns to training, which actually serves to show that this type
of training is scarce.
The returns to training  also vary by firm size and by year.  For example, in 1999,
external  training was  positively  correlated  with workers'  wages  in micro,  medium,  and
large  firms  (33,  25,  and  25  percent,  respectively).  One  implication  of the  external
training  results  is  that  policies  that  encourage  increased  training  will  lead  to  larger
productivity  gains for the economy.  Gains that  firms receive  from training  and  foreign
ownership (discussed below) are shared with employees  in the form of higher pay.
Are  rates  of return  to  training  associated  with  complementary  investments  in
technology?  Considering  the joint effect  of training  with technology  adoption increases
wages,  but  it  simultaneously  seems  to  decrease  productivity  (Tables  8  and  9).  A
plausible explanation for this is that training only has  a positive effect in certain types of
technology adoption.  For example,  the results indicate that combining in-house training
with the  acquisition  of new  numerically  controlled  computerized  machinery  increases
productivity by 44 percent.9
Table 8: Technology  Adoption and In-house  Training
Variable  1993  1999
Tatri  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Jzl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>tzl
ooled  0.08  0.04  -0.36  0.00  0.06  0.36  0.20  0.25
cro  -0.07  0.76  -2.11  0.00  0.29  0.38  -0.46  0.58
Small  0.16  0.20  -0.01  0.95  0.11  0.36  0.10  0.73
Medium  0.05  0.42  -0.22  0.02  0.08  0.47  0.56  0.03
Large  0.07  0.26  -0.29  0.00  0.13  0.36  -1.26  0.00
Source  Author's calculations  based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
9  Results disaggregating different types of technology adoption are available upon request
13Table 9: Technology  Adoption and External Training
Variable  1993  1999
Tatrx  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Producfivity  P>fzl
Pooled  0.08  0.03  -0.11  0.08  0.03  0.65  -0.23  0.13
Micro  0.19  0.44  -0.55  0.22  0.18  0.34  -0.50  0.29
Small  0.02  0.82  0.03  0.81  -0.15  0.17  -0.89  0.00
Medium  0.03  0.60  -0.25  0.00  -0.09  0.41  -0.06  0.83
Large  1  0.12  0.04  -0.02  0.85  0.14  0.30  -0.67  0.07
Source.  Author's  calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
Endogenizing  Training
Following Nielsen and Rosholm (2002), we control for selectivity bias of training.
A Treatment  Effects Model (Treatreg) was estimated to endogenize the training variable.
Outcome  P  (wages  or  productivity)  is  a  function  of  explanatory  variables  in  Z
(workers'  characteristics)  and  X  (firms'  characteristics).  Training  (TR),  that  enters  in
vector Z in equation (1) is considered as an endogenous variable (our treatment  variable).
The  binary  decision  to  obtain  the  treatment  TR  is  modeled  as  the  outcome  of  an
unobserved  latent  variable  which  represents  the  expected  present  value  of returns  to
training,  TR *.  It is assumed that TR * is a linear function of the exogenous  covariates  Q
that includes  the variables in  Z  and  X  and the instruments  (marital  status of the worker
and  number  of economic  dependents  of the  employee)10,  and  a random  component  u.
The outcome and training equations can be written as a system of equations:
P=a-Z  +± .X+6  (1)
TR*=y.Q+u  (2)
Where the worker trains according  to this rule:
TR=1,  if  TR*>0
0,  otherwise
Table  10 summarizes  the training results of the treatreg  and sureg estimations.  In  1999,
the coefficient of the  training variable  in the wage equation increased from 0.13 to 0.78.
The  coefficient  of the  external  training  variable  increased  from  0.26  to  0.77.  In  the
10  Test of the instruments were performed,  results are available upon request.
14productivity  equation, the coefficient of the training variable increased from 0.10 to 0.94.
The  coefficient  of the  external  training  variable  increased  from  0.14  to  0.23."1  One
possible  explanation  for  the  negative  correlation  is  that  firms  are  more  likely  to  train
when demand  (and the opportunity cost of labor's time) is low.'2 We are not convinced
by this explanation but are unable to offer an alternative.  We note, however, that several
other studies  have  reported  similar  findings  with endogenized  training  for a variety of
countries at different stages of development,  e.g. Dearden,  Reed, and Van Reneen  (2000)
on  British  industry,  Tan  and  Batra  (1995)  on  manufacturing  in  five  middle-income
countries  in  East  Asia  and  Latin  America,  and  Nielsen  and  Rosholm  (2002)  on three
African countries.
Table 10:  Coefficients  for Training
Wage  equation coefficients  Productivity equation coefficients
Exogenous  Endogenous  Exogenous  Endogenous
Training  Tramning  Training  Training
Traming  0.13  0.78  Training  0.10  0.94
External  External
trainng  0.26  0.79  training  0.15  0.45
Source  Author's calculations  based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
iii.  Potential Experience
The model also includes workers'  potential experience,  which is defined  as age-S-
6, where S represents the number of years  workers have accumulated  in that firm.  Both
level  and  squared  forms  of potential  experience  were  included  in  the  model,  which
allowed  for  non-linearities.  The results  of the  analysis  were  inline  with  the  expected
positive effects of potential  experience on wages in 1993  and  1999  (see Table  11).  The
positive  effect of experience  on wages increases  at a younger age,  and it continues  at an
older age but at  a decreasing rate.  In  1999, potential experience has a positive effect on
wages  and  productivity  in  all  firm  sizes.  However,  the hypothesis  test  indicates  that
workers benefit more than firms from potential experience.
"  These results are available upon request
12  Dearden, Reed and Van Reneen (2000) make this argument to explain the triplmg of productivity and
wage imnpacts of training when trainng is endogemzed.
15Table 11: Potential experience
Variable  1993  1999
Pexp  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>jzl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
ooled  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.72  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.01
\4icro  0.04  0.00  0.02  0.18  0.04  0.00  0.02  0.16
Small  0.05  0.00  -0.01  0.30  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.76
LediUM  0.04  0.00  -0.01  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.56
Large  0.05  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.04  0.00  0.02  0.02
Source. Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
iv.  Gender
This  paper  also  examines  the  effect  that  gender  has  on  both  wages  and
productivity  for various  firm  sizes.  Not  surprisingly,  female  employees  were paid  less
than their male co-workers, but they were also less productive than men in both 1993  and
1999 (see Table  12).  This finding indicates that the wage gap according to gender is due
to productivity differentials.  For  1993, the hypothesis  test indicates that the productivity
gap is much larger than the wage gap.  However, in 1999, we cannot reject the hypothesis
of the  equality of coefficients  of gender  on the wage  and productivity  equations.  This
finding  implies  that  there  is  no  gender  discrimination  since  wage  differentials  are
explained by equal or larger productivity differentials.
Table 12: Gender
Variable  1993  1999
Gen  Wage  P>jzl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P> zl  Productivity  P> zl
ooled  0.21  0.00  0.40  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.29  0.01
Micro  0.27  0.11  0.69  0.03  0.32  0.03  0.64  0.08
Small  0.31  0.00  0.18  0.11  0.02  0.79  0.69  0.00
Medium  0.13  0.02  0.11  0.25  0.22  0.00  0.16  0.31
Large  0.18  0.00  0.56  0.00  0.17  0.03  0.02  0.92
Source: Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
By using  interaction  variables,  we  found  some  results that  were  surprising  and
some that were inline with our hypotheses.  The results of the interaction variables  show
that  investment  in  education  of men  does  not  significantly  increase  men's  wages  or
productivity more than that of women (see Table  13).
16Table  13: Education-Gender
Variable  1993  1999
Edugen  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>IzI
Pooled  0.00  0.82  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.11  -0.02  0.04
Micro  0.00  0.94  -0.03  0.32  -0.01  0.50  -0.05  0.19
Small  -0.01  0.13  0.01  0.63  0.01  0.38  -0.07  0.00
Medium  0.01  0.10  0.00  0.78  -0.01  0.43  0.00  0.83
Large  0.00  0.72  -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.93  0.00  0.92
Source: Author's calculations  based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
By mixing the variables of training and  gender, we found that training  generally
increases men's wages above that of women's  (see Tables  14 and 15).  In 1993  external
training  increased  men's  wages  slightly  more  than  in-house  training  did.  In-house
training,  however,  increased  men's wages  more  in  1999  than  in  1993  in large  firms.
External training increased men's wages by a higher percentage  in 1999 than in 1993  in
small  firms.  This  generally  shows  a  trend  that  training-especially  external  training-
increased men's wages more than women's by a higher percentage  over time.
In  terms of productivity,  training  also  increased  men's productivity  more  than
women's.  In 1993  external training  increased men's productivity by slightly more than
in-house training did in large firms.  Productivity in the case of men's in-house training in
large  firms  in  1999  increased  from  2  to 26  percent  in just  6  years.  Thus,  over time
training seems to increase productivity of men more than productivity of women, but we
cannot make any definite conclusions  as to whether productivity  increases  more with in-
house or external training.
Table 14: In-house trai  ing-Gender
Variable  1993  1999
Trigen  Wage  P>Jzl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>jzl  Productivity  P>jzl
ooled  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.14  0.05  0.11  0.22  0.01
Micro  0.05  0.11  -0.17  0.00  -0.09  0.73  0.02  0.98
Small  0.02  0.15  0.00  0.97  0.13  0.16  0.62  0.00
Medium  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.00  -0.05  0.29  -0.13  0.29
ILarge  1  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.09  0.10  0.04  0.26  0.05
Source: Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
17Table 15: External training-Gender
Variable  1993  1999
Trxgen  Wage  - P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
Pooled  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.36  0.03  0.35  0.10  0.28
Micro  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.99  -0.01  0.96  -0.66  0.12
Small  0.03  0.01  -0.02  0.25  0.15  0.05  0.42  0.03
Medium  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.88  -0.02  0.75  -0.28  0.02
Large  0.05  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.02  0.74  0.10  0.54
Source  Author's calculations  based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
v.  Union Membership
By  siudying  union  membership  in  this  analysis,  it became  apparent  that  union
membership  reduces  wages  in  Mexico  across  all  firms.  In  1993  and  1999,  union
members  earned  lower  wages  than  non-union  members  (see  Table  16)  by  24  and  28
percent,  respectively.  This finding  is  surprising because  studies  from wage  analysis  in
developed  countries  usually  show  that union  members  earn  more  than their non-union
member  colleagues.  However,  in another World  Bank study (1999),  it  was found  that
unionization does not increase wages in Mexico.
Despite  the  decrease  in  wages  that  union members  face,  statistically  significant
numbers  show  that union  members  were  more  productive  than  non-members  in both
1993  and  1999.  The productivity  gap  is  17  percent in  1999  and  10 percent  in  1993.
However,  further research  is needed to establish whether union members themselves  are
more productive or if it is the firms they work for that are more productive.
Table 16: Union  me  bership
Variable  1993  1999
Lreg  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
ooled  -0.24  0.00  0.10  0.00  -0.28  0.00  0.17  0.00
Micro  -0.08  0.34  0.73  0.00  -0.11  0.12  0.05  0.76
Srnall  -0.10  0.00  0.12  0.01  -0.19  0.00  0.30  0.00
Medium  -0.30  0.00  0.03  0.39  -0.30  0.00  0.07  0.20
Large  -0.29  0.00  -0.02  0.71  -0.36  0.00  0.23  0.00
Source: Authors'  calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC
18In  1993  union members earned  lower wages than non-members by 10, 30 and 29
percent less in small,  medium,  and large  firms, respectively.  In 1999 the effect of union
membership on wages by firn  size was increasingly negative.
vi.  Type of Contract
Both  permanent  and  temporary  worker  contracts  are  examined  in  order  to
consider how these two types of contracts  affect workers'  wages and productivity.  The
main  differences  between  the workers  in these contracts  are their employment  benefits,
the  duration  of these benefits,  and their skills.  Employers  have been  found to be more
likely to invest in human capital if they were planning on retaining their employees  over
the long term.
Table  17: Type of contract
Variable  1993  1999
Twork  Wage  P>jzl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
ooled  -0.09  0.00  -0.09  0.00  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.07
icro  -0.11  0.11  0.12  0.32  0.03  0.57  0.27  0.03
Small  -0.15  0.00  -0.03  0.61  0.04  0.33  0.17'  0.05
Medium  -0.06  0.02  -0.09  0.04  0.02  0.39  0.02  0.76
Large  -0.09  0.00  -0.03  0.46  0.04  0.09  -0.11  0.11
Source: Authors' calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC
Table  17  shows the  estimated  wage differentials  associated  with a worker's type
of contract - temporary  or permanent.  In 1993  permanent workers  earned an average of
9 percent  lower  wages  and were  9 percent  less  productive  than  temporarily-employed
workers.  However,  the  results  shifted in  1999,  whereby  permanent workers  earned  3
percent  higher  wages  and  were  7  percent  more  productive  than  temporary  workers.
Furthermore,  we  cannot  reject  the  test  of hypothesis  that  the  wage  and  productivity
coefficients are equal.
19Firm Characteristics
i.  Research  and Development
In  1993  R&D  increased  both  wages  and  productivity.  Wages  increased  by  2
percent,  and productivity  increased by 20 percent (see Table  18).  However, this trend did
not continue  in  1999  since R&D  and productivity were  found to be strongly negatively
correlated.  However,  foreign R&D  was  found to have  a positive  effect on both wages
and productivity,  by 19 and 90 percent respectively.  13
Table 18: Research & Development
Variable  1993  1999
Rd  Wage  P>Izi  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
ooled  0.02  0.08  0.20  0.00  0.02  0.52  -0.20  0.03
Micro  -0.14  0.09  0.23  0.13  0.03  0.81  0.59  0.05
Small  0.00  0.94  0.10  0.04  0.30  0.00  -1.15  0.00
Medium  0.02  0.37  0.10  0.00  -0.15  0.01  0.17  0.23
Large  0.03  0.21  0.29  0.00  0.02  0.73  -0.12  0.44
Source  Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
ii.  Ownership and Export Orientation
The following  two  tables illustrate  two important  firm  characteristics  effects  on
wages  and productivity.  The  two  variables  that  are  used  are  ownership  structure  and
export orientation.
It  is  presumed  that  a firm  with  partial  foreign  ownership  is more  likely  to  be
affiliated  with  international  markets  than a  strictly Mexican-owned  firm.  In both  1993
and  1999, foreign ownership had a positive effect on productivity  and wages, controlling
for  both  firm  and  individual  characteristics  (see  Table  19).  Firms  mostly  owned  by
foreigners  are  statistically  more  productive  than  firms  owned  by  locals,  and  they pay
higher wages.  In  1993  mostly  foreign-owned  firms were  54 percent  more productive,
and they paid 7 percent more than firms  that had little or no foreign  ownership.  In  1999
1 3Results that include  foreign R&D are available  upon request.
20mostly foreign owned firms were  28 percent more productive,  and they paid  13 percent
more  than  the  mostly  domestic-owned  firms.  Furthermore,  from  1993  to  1999  the
positive correlation  of foreign  ownership with wages in small,  medium,  and large  firms
increased  substantially.  The hypothesis  test indicates  that the productivity  gap is larger
than the wage gap meaning that firms benefit the most from foreign ownership.
Table 19: Foreign capital
Variable  1993  1999
Fc  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
ooled  0.07  0.00  0.54  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.28  0.00
icro  -0.04  0.88  0.07  0.88
Small  0.18  0.05  1.17  0.00  0.38  0.00  -0.98  0.00
Medium  0.07  0.09  0.41  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.61  0.00
0.07  0.02  0.56  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.35  0.00
Source.  Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
Surprisingly;  the  size  of  export  share  is  associated  with  lower  wages  and
productivity in 1993  and with lower productivity  in 1999 (see Table 20).  Productivity in
1993 was shown to be negatively  correlated with export orientation  in all  sizes of firms
except  micro.  In  1999  productivity  was  still  negatively  correlated  with  export
orientation, although to a lesser degree.
Table 20: Export Share
Variable  1993  1999
Exp  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>fzl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>jzl
ooled  -0.13  0.00  -1.09  0.00  -0.01  0.62  -0.25  0.00
Micro  0.01  0.98  1.21  0.00  -0.05  0.73  1.90  0.00
Small  0.10  0.32  -0.74  0.00  -0.10  0.08  -0.10  0.48
Medium  0.03  0.54  -1.37  0.00  -0.13  0.00  -0.34  0.00
Large  -0.23  0.00  -1.27  0.00  0.05  0.11  -0.42  0.00
Source- Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
iii.  Quality Control
Empirical  evidence  suggests  that  a finn's  introduction  of quality  control  measures
enhances its productivity and exports (see World Bank, 2001).  Quality control only had a
21positive  correlation  with wages  in  1999  but not  in  1993  (see  Table  21).  Furthermore,
productivity was negatively correlated with quality control in 1993.
The  correlation  of quality  control  with  productivity  varies  by  firm  size.  For
example,  the introduction of quality control in 1999 increased productivity in small firms,
but  it  decreased  productivity  in  medium-size  firms.  Quality  control  did  not  have  a
correlation  with productivity  in micro or large firms in  1999.  However, when comparing
statistically significant productivity results for small firms in  1993 and 1999, productivity
seems to increase over time.
Table 21: Quality control
Variable  1993  1999
Qc  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P> zl  Productivity  P> zl
ooled  0.04  0.27  -0.23  0.00  0.08  0.05  0.15  0.16
icro  0.20  0.49  0.84  0.12  0.21  0.23  0.05  0.91
Small  -0.18  0.67  -2.59  0.00  0.05  0.63  1.55  0.0l
Medium  0.06  0.35  0.06  0.59  -0.19  0.02  -0.78  0.00
Large  0.03  0.51  -0.54  0.00  0.05  0.37  0.05  0.74
Source Author's calculatons based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
iv.  Sectors
Industry-specific  factors  were measured  by including  dummy variables  for  each
of the  nine major manufacturing  sectors:  (1)  food,  beverages,  and tobacco;  (2)  textiles,
clothing,  and  leather;  (3)  wood  and  wood products;  (4) paper  and  paper  products;  (5)
chemicals,  oil  derivatives,  and  coal;  (6) non-metallic  mineral  products;  (7)  basic metal
industries;  (8)  metal products,  machinery,  and  equipment;  and (9)  other  manufacturing
industries.
Controlling for other firm and individual characteristics,  the estimations show that
in 1993  employees working in sectors other than the food, beverages,  and tobacco sector
earned around  10 percent more than them, except for the wood and products and the other
manufacturing  industries  (see Table  22).  However,  only basic metal industries  showed
superior productivity compared  to the food sector by 21  percent more.  In  1999 workers
in all other sectors -other  than food, beverages,  and tobacco-  received  higher wages,
22while  only  basic  metal,  chemicals,  oil  derivatives,  and  coal  demonstrated  higher
productivity.
Table 22: Sector of activity
Variable  1993  1999
Div  Wage  P> zl  Productivity  P> zl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
div922  0.09  0.00  -0.41  0.00  0.05  0.03  -0.45  0.00
div923  0.00  0.92  -0.73  0.00  -0.02  0.49  -0.47  0.00
div924  0.08  0.00  -0.43  0.00  0.05  0.10  -0.01  0.90
div925  0.08  0.00  -0.09  0.02  0.08  0.00  0.30  0.00
div926  0.11  0.00  -0.71  0.00  0.04  0.18  -0.58  0.00
div927  0.07  0.07  0.21  0.00  0.06  0.05  0.64  0.00
div928  0.03  0.05  -0.33  0.00  0.07  0.00  -0.04  0.49
div929  0.06  0.29  -0.60  0.00  0.04  0.29  -0.37  0.00
Source: Author's calculations  based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
v.  Location
The following regions (1) the North, (2) the Center,  (3) the South, and (4) Mexico
City were considered in terms of their influence on wages  and productivity.
In  1993,  workers employed in southern  firms earned lower wages  by an average
of 21  percent  than those  employed  in  northern  firms  located near  the  border with  the
United States.  In  1993,  employees  in Mexico  City earned  6 percent higher wages  than
northern  workers;  however,  in  1999  this  distribution  shifted  dramatically.  Established
firms  in the  central,  southern,  and  Mexico  City  regions  paid  lower  wages  than  their
northern counterparts  by 12; 32; and 10 percent, respectively.  The southern regions have
always paid the lowest wages.  However, the northern region has surpassed Mexico City
in terms of the wages it pays.  This is possibly due to its proximity to the United States
and  the  favorable  conditions  that  has  brought  for  the  region  since  the  initiation  of
NAFTA (Esquivel et. al. 2002).
With respect  to productivity,  firms in Mexico  City were  6 percent less productive
than northern firms in 1993.  In  1999 firms  located in the central region were  13  percent
more  productive  than  northern  firms,  while  southern  firms  were  25  percent  less
23productive  (Table 23).  Thus, southern firms have shown to not only pay less wages, but
they are also less productive.
Table 23: Region
Center
Variable  1993  1999
reg2  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
Pooled  0.01  0.69  -0.03  0.30  -0.12  0.00  0.13  0.00
Micro  -0.10  0.25  -0.36  0.03  -0.29  0.00  -0.13  0.28
Small  0.06  0.16  0.35  0.00  -0.14  0.00  0.00  0.98
Medium  -0.04  0.17  -0.30  0.00  -0.10  0.00  -0.05  0.40
Large  0.04  0.10  0.15  0.00  -0.03  0.30  0.27  0.00
South
Variable  1993  1999
reg2  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>IzI  Wage  P>fzl  Productivity  P>fzj
Pooled  -0.21  0.00  0.01  0.90  -0.32  0.00  -0.25  0.00
Micro  0.10  0.42  -0.20  0.40  -0.43  0.00  -0.50  0.02
Small  -0.30  0.00  0.18  0.17  -0.46  0.00  0.06  0.77
Medium  -0.30  0.00  -0.50  0.00  -0.18  0.00  -0.61  0.00
Large  -0.18  0.00  0.43  0.00  -0.22  0.00  -0.14  0.28
Mexico  Cit  y
Variable  1993  1999
reg2  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
Pooled  0.06  0.00  -0.06  0.06  -0.10  0.00  -0.01  0.86
Micro  -0.09  0.34  0.02  0.92  -0.24  0.00  0.36  0.06
Small  0.02  0.68  -0.01  0.86  0.01  0.86  -0.46  0.00
Medium  0.05  0.10  -0.24  0.00  -0.12  0.00  -0.12  0.13
Large  0.09  0.01  0.07  0.17  -0.11  0.00  0.01  0.92
Source  Author's calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC.
In  1999,  micro  firms  -in  the  central,  southern,  and  Mexico  City regions  paid
lower wages  than northern  firms by  29;  43;  and 24  percent,  respectively.  Small  firms
located in the center and  in the south paid 14  and 46 percent,  respectively,  lower wages
than  northern  firms.  Medium-size  firms paid  10,  18,  and  12 percent (center,  south,  and
Mexico  City, respectively)  lower  wages  than those  firms  located  in the north.  Finally,
large  southern  firms  paid  22 percent  lower  wages than  large northern  firrns,  and  large
24firms in Mexico  City paid  11  percent  less.  Thus,  southern  firms paid the lowest wages
across  all sizes of firms compared to all of the other regions,  and northern  firms paid the
most.
With  respect  to productivity  in  1999,  the  greatest  productivity  differentials  are
found in southern micro and medium firns that were 50 and 61 percent,  respectively, less
productive  than northern firns.  Small firms  in Mexico  City were also found to be much
less productive  than small firms in the northern region (46 percent).  In general,  southern
firms tend to be less productive.
vi.  Firm Size
In  1993  productivity  in  small,  medium,  and  large  firms  was  higher than  micro
frmns  by 23,  30 and  27 percent,  respectively.  This  productivity  gap  among  firm  sizes
increased  from  1993  to  1999.  In  1999,  small,  medium,  and  large  firms  were  more
productive than micro firms by 38; 93; and 124 percent, respectively.
Table 24: Firm size (Pooled  Estimation)
Variable  1993  1999
Size  Wage  P>jzi  Productivity  P>Izl  Wage  P>Izl  Productivity  P>Izl
Small  -0.02  0.51  0.23  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.38  0.00
edium  -0.04  0.38  0.30  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.93  0.00
Lrge  I  -0.10  0.06  0.27  0.00  0.25  0.00  1.24  0.00
Source  Authors'  calculations based on ENTRAM-ENESTYC
In  1999  firm  size  was  positively  correlated  with  wages  and  productivity  (see
Table 24).  With respect to wages, large firms paid close to  25 percent  more than micro
firms in  1999.  The correlation of firm  size with wages  and productivity  is positive,  but
the impact on the latter was shown to be far greater.
6. Conclusions
Using  linked  employee-employer  manufacturing  sector  data  (the  ENTRAM-
ENESTYC surveys  from 1993  and 1999),  this paper examined the micro-determinants  of
wages  and productivity  in Mexico.  We used  two kind of variables,  those of the supply
25side  which  are  the  workers'  characteristics;  and  those  of  the  demand  side  which
correspond to the firms' characteristics.
First, the wage premium  increased with the years of schooling.  Furthermore,  we
found that the rate of returns  to  education  have not been  overstated  in traditional  wage
equations.  We  might be  underestimating  the effect  of the  schooling  coefficient  in  our
estimation  since we did not  control  for the  endogeneity  of this  variable.  An  additional
year  of  schooling  in  1999  was  shown  to  yield  a  10  percent  increase  in  wages.
Furthermore,  additional  years  of schooling  were  also  shown  to  increase  productivity.
Rates of return to education by firm size increased from  1993 to  1999.  The workers have
higher benefits from schooling than firms.
Second, both employees  and employers benefited the most from external training.
The  wage  return,  from  in-house  and  external  training  changed  from  being  negative  in
1993 to being positive in 1999, but whereas  in-house training only increased wages by 4
percent,  external  training increased wages by 26 percent.  External training was not only
shown  to  benefit  the workers;  employers  who  utilized  external  training  enjoyed higher
levels of productivity  as well by an average  of 14 percent.  Firms  were the only ones to
benefit  from  in-house  training  in  1993,  and  it  seems  that  employees  and  employers
benefit equally from external training.  Both productivity and wage impacts of training are
even higher when training is endogeneized.
Third,  potential experience was shown to have increased wages in both 1993  and
1999.  However, there were  decreasing  returns to potential experience.  Workers  benefit
more than firms from potential experience.
Fourth,  on average  women were paid less than men were in both 1993  and  1999,
but they were  also  shown to  be  less productive  than  men.  Furthermore,  investment  in
men's education did not seem to significantly increase their wages or their productivity to,
a level  above women; however,  training did increase men's wages and productivity more
26than for wcmen.  There seems to be no gender discrimination  since wage differentials  are
explained by equal or larger productivity differentials.
Fifth,  union membership was shown to decrease  wages across all sizes of firms in
both  1993  and  1999.  Despite this decrease in wages,  union members  were shown to be
more  productive  than  non-union  members;  however,  further  research  needs  to  be
undertaken  to determine whether union members themselves  are more productive or if it
is the firms they work for that are more productive.
Sixth,  in  1993  permanent  workers  earned  less  and  were  less  productive  than
temporary workers;  however, these results changed in 1999 as permanent workers  earned
higher wages and were more productive than temporary workers.
As we have mentioned,  we could not only rely on characteristics  of the workers
while  ignoring characteristics  of the firms that could very well also  influence wages and
productivity.  For this reason, we chose six firm characteristics  to examine in terms of the
effect on wages and productivity.  -
First,  R&D was  shown  to have  increased both wages  and productivity  in  1993.
However, this trend did not continue in 1999 as productivity  was shown to be negatively
correlated  with R&D.  Despite  all of this,  foreign  R&D has  a  strong positive  effect on
wages and productivity.
Second,  foreign  ownership  proved  to have a positive  and  statistically  significant
correlation with productivity  and wages in both  1993  and  1999.  Firms benefit the most
from foreign ownership.  However,  export-oriented firms seemed less productive  in 1993
and 1999, and they paid lower wages.
Third,  quality  control  was  positively  correlated  with  wages  in  1999  but  not  in
1993.  Furthernore, quality control was negatively correlated with productivity in 1993.
27Fourth, this paper examines nine major manufacturing industries.  Workers in the
food,  beverages,  and tobacco industry were found to earn  lower wages than the workers
in  the  other industries;  however,  workers  in these other industries  were  not much more
productive.
Fifth,  by comparing  four  regions of Mexico  - north,  center,  south,  and Mexico
City - regional  wage  and productivity  gaps  were  found.  In  terms of wages,  southern
firms paid  the  least.  In  1993,  firms  in Mexico  City paid  their  employees  the  highest
wages,  but in  1999  it was  the northern  firms.  In terms  of productivity,  southern  firms
were  also  the  least  productive.  Small  southern  firms  exhibited  the worst  numbers  in
terms of their productivity.  In  1993  northern  firms  were  the most productive,  but the
central region surpassed the northern region in terms of productivity in 1999.
Sixth,  larger firms  were  more  productive  and  paid higher  wages  than the  other
firms.  The  correlation  of size  on wages  and productivity  is positive,  but the  impact on
productivity is far greater than on wages.  Whereas medium-sized firms were shown to be
the most productive in 1993,  small and large firms were nearly as productive.  However,
in 1999 large firms became  much more productive  than medium  and small firms.  Large
firms were  the most productive,  followed in productivity  according to  size by medium,
small,  and  then micro  firms.  Wages  also  followed  the  same trend  in  1999  in that the
large firms paid the highest wages.
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30Appendix A
The national survey of employment,  wages,  technology,  and training (ENESTYC)
There  are  two  ENESTYC  surveys  collected  by  INEGI:  one  for  manufacturing
establishments  and  another for maquila-exporting  firms.  The unit of observation  is the
firm.
The  universe  for the  manufacturing  survey  is the  Economic  Census  updated  with  the
Encuesta  Industrial  Mensual  (ELM)  and  with  information  from  the  petrochemical
industry.  The  maquila  survey  universe  is  the  Economic  Census.  The  manufacturing
universe includes  54 activities and 309,157 establishments.  The survey design is random,
stratified  at national level  for each of the 54 activities, and for firm size.  The selection  is
as follows:
1.  Stratify  establishments  in  four  groups  for  each  activity  according  to  firm  size
(number of employees).
2.  The sample selection is random and independent  for each activity stratum.
3.  The expansion factor is calculated as the inverse of the probability of selection.
The national survey of workers in the manufacturing sector (ENTRAM)
ENTRAM is also collected by INEGI.  The universe is the worker of the establishments
interviewed  in the ENESTYC.  The sampling design is random,  bi-staged,  and stratified
for each of the  9  sub-sectors  of the Clasificacion  Mexicana  de Actividades  y Productos
(CMAP)  1994  and  by  firm  size.  Establishments  are  selected  in  the  first  stage.
Manufacturing workers are selected in the second stage.  This process is as follows:
1.  In  each  sub-sector,  the  establishments  are  stratified  in four groups  according  to
firm size (measured by number of workers).
2.  In  the  first  stage,  a  random  sample  of approximately  10  percent  of firms  is
selected by stratum.
3.  In the second stage, based in the payroll of the establishments,  a random  sample
of 10 workers is selected from each firm distributed as follows:
a)  1 manager (director)
b)  3 employees
c)  3 specialized workers
d)  3 general workers
4.  In the  case of micro  establishments  with ten  or less workers,  all  employees  are
interviewed.
5.  The expansion factor is calculated as the inverse of the probability of selection.
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Table B1: List of variables 1993-1999
Variable  Definition  Value
age  Age of the worker  Continuous
edu  Years of education of the worker  Continuous
time  Time working for that firm  Continuous
time2  Tume working for that firm squared  Continuous
pexp  Potential experience  (age-time-6)
pexp2  Potential experience  squared  (age-time-6)2
1 = male
gen  Gender  0 = female
1= the worker belongs to a union
Ireg  Worker's union  0 = otherwise
1  = the worker receives in-house
training
teachl  In-house formal training  0 = otherwise
P-the worker receives external
formal training
teachx  External  formal training  0 = otherwise
Manufacturing  industries:
1) Food, beverages, and tobacco.
2) Textiles,  clothing, and leather.
3) Wood and wood products.
4)  Paper, paper products, printing and
ublishing.
5)  Chemucals, oil derivatives,  and  1=the firm belongs to certain
div#  coal.  industry
6) Non-metallic mineral products.
7) Basic metallic industries.
8)Metallic products,  machinery, and
equipment.
.9) Other manufacturing  industries  0=otherwise
Reglons:
1) North.  Includes the states of Baja
California, Baja California Sur,
Coahuila, Chihuahua,  Durango,
Nuevo Le6n, Sinaloa, Sonora,
Tamaulipas,  and Zacatecas.
2) Center. Includes  the states of:
Aguascalientes,  Colima, Guanajuato,
Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan,
Morelos,  Nayarit, Puebla, Quer6taro,
reg#  San Luis Potosi, and Tlaxcala.  I =the firm belongs to certain region
3) South. Includes  the states of
Campeche,  Chiapas, Guerrero,
Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco,
Veracruz,  and Yucatan.
k)  Mexico City  0=otherwise
32Variable  Definition  Value
Firm size according to the number of
workers:  1) Micro  1 - 15
size#  2) Small  16 -100
3) Medium  101 -250  1 = the firm belongs to a certain size
4) Large  250 - more  0 = otherwise
agef  Age of  the firm in months  Continuous
Percentage  of directors working in the
direc  firm  Continuous
1 = the worker has a permanent
contract
twork  Type of worker by his or her contract  0 = otherwise
1 = the firm's foreign capital > 50%
fic  Foreign capital  0 = otherwise
1 = the firm's exports >50% of total
production  0=
exp  Export orientation  otherwise
1 = the firm invests in R&D
rd  R&D  0 = otherwise
1 = the firm has an external quality
control (e.g.  Iso-9000)
qc  Quality control  0 = otherwise
1 = the firm has adopted new
technology in the year
ta  Technology  adoption  0= otherwise
I  = the firm has adopted certain new
Type of technology adopted  technology in the year
1 = manual equipment  0 = otherwise
2 = automatic equipment
3 = machinery tools
tc#  4 = machinery of numeric  control
5 = comnputerized machinery of
numeric control
6 = robots
7 = did not acquire machinery  of
equipment
I = R&D was done in a foreign
country
rdint  Foreign R&D  0 = otherwise
1 = organizational changes happened
as a consequence of technology
Organizational  change derived from  adoption
orgch  TA  0 = otherwise
log of the number of hours worked in
Ih  efrm  Continuous
tatri  Interactive  variable  ta*teachi
tatrx  Interactive variable  ta*teachx
edugen  Interactive  variable  edu*gen
timtri  Interactive variable  time*teachi
33Variable  Definition  Value
timtrx  Interactive  variable  time*teachx
sxdv#  Interactive  variable  gen*div#
dv#ex  Interactive  vanable  exp*div#
agetri  Interactive variable  age*teachi
agetrx  Interactive vanable  age*teachx
dv#thx  Interactive variable  div#*teachx
labtn  Interactive variable  Ireg*teachi
labtrx  Interactive variable  lreg*teachx
agelab  Interactive variable  age*lreg
extr  Interactive  variable  exp*teachi
extrx  Interactive variable  exp*teachx
dv#lab  Interactive  variable  div#*lreg
rdlab  Interactive variable  rd*lreg
dv#fc  Interactive  variable  div#*fc
dv#rd  Interactive variable  div#*rd
explab  Interactive variable  exp*lreg
fcexp  Interactive variable  fc*exp
rdtn  Interactive variable  rd*teachi
rdtrx  Interactive vanable  rd*teachx
trigen  Interactive  variable  teachu*gen
trxgen  Interactive  variable  teachx*gen
teci#  Interactive  variable  teachi*tc#
tecx#  Interactive  vanable  teachx*tc#
hmw  logarithm of the monthly wage  Continuous
Iva  logarithm of the value added  Continuous
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Tables of pooled estimation
Table Cl: Joint estimation for wages and
productivi  V
1993  1999
Wages  Productivity  Wages  Productivity
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
ducation  0.0920  0.0211  0.0987  0.0444
Pot.Exp.  0.0430  -0.0011  0.0388  0.0124
Pot.Exp.Sq.  -0.0005  -0.0001  -0.0005  -0.0001
Gender  0.2087  0.3958  0.2485  0.292
In-houseTr  -0.1304  0.1566  0.0482  0.0714
ExtemalTr  -0.1624  0.0650  0.2553  0.1399
Age Firm  -0.0006  -0.0008  0.0001  0.0006
Smnall  -0.0226  0.2249  0.0571  0.3746
Medium  -0.0369  0.3005  0.1532  0.9315
Lage  -0.0994  0.2724  0.2446  1.2390
Center  0.0063  -0.0286  -0.1186  0.1262
South  -0.2107  0.0071  -0.3199  -0.2514
exico City  0.0558  -0.0597  -0.1018  -0.0097
Division 2  0.0889  -0.4067  0.0470  -0.449
Division 3  0.0027  -0.7288  -0.02 19  -0.4716
Division 4  0.0838  -0.4259  0.0467  -0.0099
ivision 5  0.0816  -0.0889  0.0762  0.2960
Division 6  0.1058  -0.7046  0.0390  -0.5756
Division 7  0.0682  0.2049  0.0644  0.6441
Division 8  0.0334  -0.3268  0.0735  -0.0349
Division 9  0.0596  -0.6036  0.0355  -0.3742
ermnanent  -0.0892  -0.0853  0.0314  0.0744
Tech. Adop.  0.0257  0.0878  0.1180  0.2016
Foreign Cap.  0.0663  0.5439  0.1327  0.2832
Exports  -0.1263  -1.0886  -0.0098  -0.2456
Qua. Control  0.0410  -0.2300  0.0774  0.1498
mon  -0.2379  0.0985  -0.2822  0.1735
Hours  0.0684  0.0666  0.0030  -0.1506
Ed*Gen  0.0008  -0.0202  -0.0069  -0.0228
InTr*Gen  0.0247  0.0111  0.0497  0.2213
ExTr*Gen  0.0417  0.0061  0.0333  0.1019
R&D  0.0224  0.2010  0.0224  -0.2031
Constant  5.0979  2.6621  6.0442  3.552
R-squared  0.5582  0.2444  0.5157  0.2654
No. Obs.  6802  5757
Coefficients in bold type are  significant at 10% level
35Table C2: Test of equality of the coefficients  for the
simultaneous  estimation
Ho: coe  ient varx[productivity  eq.] = coefficient varx[wage eq.]
Variable  p-value (1993)  p-value  (1999)
Education  0.0000  0.0000
ot.Exp.  0.0000  0.0000
Gender  0.0060  0.7080
-houseTr  0.0006  0.7438
ExtemalTr  0.0085  0.1590
Age Firm  0.8965  0.0000
Small  0.0002  0.0000
Medium  0.0001  0.0000
Lage  0.0004  0.0000
Center  0.2618  0.0000
South  0.0005  0.4030
Mexico City  0.0012  0.0916
ivision 2  0.0000  0.0000
Division 3  0.0000  0.0000
Division 4  0.0000  0.4689
Division  5  0.0001  0.0004
ivision 6  0.0000  0.0000
ivision  7  0.0659  0.0000
Division  8  0.0000  0.0378
Division 9  0.0000  0.0000
errnanent  0.8993  0.3040
Tech. Adop.  0.0197  0.1340
oreign Cap.  0.0000  0.0058
Exports  0.0000  0.0000
Qua.  Control  0.0000  0.5058
Union  0.0000  0.0000
Hours  0.9327  0.0000
d*Gen  0.0021  0.1707
InTr*Gen  0.1077  0.0461
ExTr*Gen  0.0000  0.4804
R&D  0.0000  0.0167
If  p-value<O. 10, then Ho can be rejected
36Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2938  Recurrent  Expenditure Requirements  Ron Hood  December 2002  M  Galatis
of Capital Projects  Estimation for  David Husband  31177
Budget  Purposes  Fei Yu
WPS2939  School Attendance and Child Labor  Gladys  Lopez-Acevedo  December 2002  M  Geller
in Ecuador  85155
WPS2940  The Potential  Demand  for an  HIV/  Hillegonda Maria Dutilh  December 2002  H  Sladovich
AIDS  Vaccine in  Brazil  Novaes  37698




Jose de la  Rocha Carvalheiro
WPS2941  Income Convergence  during the  Branko Milanovic  January 2003  P  Sader
Disintegration of the World  33902
Economy,  1919-39
WPS2942  Why is Son  Preference so  Persistent  Monica Das Gupta  January 2003  M  Das Gupta
in  East and South  Asia? A Cross-  Jiang Zhenghua  31983
Country Study of China,  India, and the  Li Bohua
Republic of Korea  Xie Zhenming
Woojin Chung
Bae Hwa-Ok
WPS2943  Capital  Flows,  Country  Risk,  Norbert Fiess  January 2003  R  lzquierdo
and Contagion  84161
WPS2944  Regulation,  Productivity, and  Giuseppe  Nicoletti  January 2003  Social  Protection
Growth  OECD  Evidence  Stefano  Scarpetta  Advisory  Service
85267
WPS2945  Micro-Finance  and  Poverty  Evidence  Shahidur R  Khandker  January 2003  D  Afzal
Using Panel Data from  Bangladesh  36335
WPS2946  Rapid  Labor Reallocation with a  Jan  Rutkowski  January 2003  J  Rutkowski
Stagnant Unemployment  Pool  The  84569
Puzzle of the Labor  Market in  Lithuania
WPS2947  Tax Systems  in Transition  Pradeep Mitra  January 2003  S  Tassew
Nicholas Stern  88212
WPS2948  The  Impact of Contractual  Savings  Gregorio  Impavido  January 2003  P  Braxton
Institutions on  Securities  Markets  Alberto  R  Musalem  32720
Thierry Tressel
WPS2949  Intersectoral Migration  in  Southeast  Rita Butzer  January 2003  P  Kokila
Asia  Evidence from  Indonesia,  Yair Mundlak  33716
Thailand,  and the Philippines  Donald F. Larson
WPS2950  Is the Emerging  Nonfarm  Market  Dominique van de Walle  January 2003  H  Sladovich
Economy the Route Out of  Poverty  Dorothyjean Cratty  37698
in Vietnam?
WPS2951  Land Allocation  in Vietnam's  Martin  Ravallion  January 2003  H  Sladovich
Agrarian Transition  Dominique van de Walle  37698Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2952  The Effects of a Fee-Waiver Program  Nazmul  Chaudhury  January 2003  N.  Chaudhury
on  Health Care  Utilization among the  Jeffrey Hammer  84230
Poor  Evidence from  Armenia  Edmundo  Murrugarra
WPS2953  Health  Facility Surveys: An  Magnus Lindelbw  January 2003  H. Sladovich
Introduction  Adam Wagstaff  37698
WPS2954  Never Too Late to Get Together  Bartlomiej  Kaminski  January 2003  P. Flewitt
Again: Turning  the Czech and Slovak  Beata Smarzynska  32724
Customs  Union into a Stepping Stone
to EU  Integration
WPS2955  The Perversity of Preferences.  The  Caglar Ozden  January 2003  P. Flewitt
Generalized System  of Preferences  Eric Reinhardt  32724
and Developing Country Trade
Policies,  1976-2000
WPS2956  Survey Compliance  and the  Johan A. Mistiaen  January 2003  P. Sader
Distribution of Income  Martin  Ravallion  33902
WPS2957  Mexico  In-Firm  Training for the  Hong Tan  January 2003  H.  Tan
Knowledge Economy  Gladys  Lopez-Acevedo  33206
WPS2958  Globalization and Workers in  Martin  Rama  January 2003  H.  Sladovich
Developing Countries  37698
WPS2959  Wage Differentials and State-  Michael M.  Lokshin  January 2003  P.  Sader
Private Sector  Employment  Choice  Branko  Jovanovic  33902
in the Federal  Republic of Yugoslavia
WPS2960  The  Poverty/Environment  Nexus in  Susmita Dasgupta  January 2003  Y  D'Souza
Cambodia and Lao  People's  Uwe Deichmann  31449
Democratic  Republic  Craig Meisner
David Wheeler
WPS2961  Strategic Planning  for Poverty  Rob Swinkels  January  2003  N.  Lopez
Reduction in  Vietnam  Progress and  Carrie Turk  88032
Challenges for Meeting the Localized
Millennium Development  Goals
WPS2962  High Consumption  Volatility.  Philippe Auffret  January 2003  K.  Tomlinson
The  Impact of Natural  Disasters?  39763
WPS2963  Catastrophe  Insurance  Market in the  Philippe Auffret  January 2003  K.  Tomlinson
Caribbean Region.  Market Failures  39763
and Recommendations  for  Public
Sector  Interventions